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1. Introduction 
Expansionary macroeconomic policies were adopted worldwide in response to the financial 
crisis. These policies aimed at stabilising financial conditions and fostering the economic 
recovery. However, the abundant global liquidity, together with the improvement in economic 
prospects in emerging markets, have led to a two-speed recovery in which emerging 
economies are growing faster than advanced economies, and the former are experiencing 
large capital inflows.  
Recently, the fiscal problems in euro area countries, and the associated volatility in financial 
markets, have somewhat reduced investors’ willingness to hold risky assets. Nevertheless, 
capital inflows to emerging market economies have continued. This paper analyses some of 
the implications of large capital inflows to emerging economies, as well as possible policy 
response options to deal with them. 
In general, capital flows render many benefits to the recipient economies. Foreign resources 
complement domestic savings in financing investment and also contribute to the 
development of domestic financial markets. Despite these benefits, however, the magnitude 
and speed of capital flows to emerging economies could pose significant risks. In particular, 
their surge over the last year and a half has raised concerns about excessive exchange rate 
appreciation and the corresponding adverse impact on exports and growth. Furthermore, 
large capital inflows may contribute to an unsustainable expansion of credit, generate asset 
price bubbles and, consequently, increase financial fragility. They also raise concerns about 
emerging economies’ vulnerability to a sudden reversal in capital flows and the resulting 
implications for financial stability and economic activity. 
In order to address the risks associated with capital inflow surges, we believe in 
implementing a coordinated policy response that combines measures on several fronts, such 
as: (i) changes in the macroeconomic policy stance, including both monetary and fiscal 
policies; (ii) foreign reserve accumulation; (iii) financial regulation and supervision (what have 
recently been called “macroprudential” measures); and (iv) structural reforms to the 
economy, which could include opening certain sectors that had been previously closed to 
foreign investment. All these policy actions convey both benefits and costs, which are often 
difficult to quantify, and which policymakers must take into consideration when assessing the 
appropriate policy response.  
We also believe that the adequate policy mix depends on the nature of the capital flows and 
the specific conditions in each country. Central banks, along with other authorities, usually 
play a major role in the policy response to large capital inflows. A key issue is whether capital 
inflows to emerging economies are mainly driven by these countries’ strong economic 
fundamentals, and thus are likely to remain stable over time, or if they are primarily driven by 
the abundant liquidity in the global economy. However, disentangling the determinants of 
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flows is a difficult task that requires a thorough analysis of economic conditions, as well as 
the policymakers’ judgment. This paper will not deal with these issues. 
That being said, this paper argues that when the authorities have reasons to believe that 
capital inflows are primarily driven by fundamental factors, they should sooner rather than 
later accept the inevitability of a real exchange rate appreciation. In such a case, it would be 
desirable to induce an orderly real appreciation. Changes in the macroeconomic policy 
stance may help with this process.  
However, if some of these flows are perceived to be temporary, reflecting the unusually low 
interest rates in advanced economies and the corresponding abundant global liquidity, the 
challenge for policymakers is far more complex. In this case, policymakers should resist the 
pressures to adopt measures that are designed to attenuate part of the unwelcome short-
term consequences of capital inflows, but which could impose significant distortions on the 
prospects for economic growth in the long run. An example may be the use of capital 
controls, which recently have been referred to as “macroprudential” measures. If such 
controls are perceived to be discretionary policy actions against capital mobility and 
international financial integration, investors’ confidence can deteriorate, leading to a 
reduction in the amount of stable and long-term capital flows. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the international environment 
associated with the surge in capital inflows to emerging market economies during the last 
year and a half. Section 3 discusses the main concerns related to large capital inflows to 
these economies. Section 4 analyses the policy response options to these inflows, taking into 
account the nature of the inflows as well as the benefits and costs related to the different 
policy alternatives. Section 5 discusses the Mexican policy response to capital inflows. 
Section 6 closes with some final remarks. 
2.  The international environment 
As a result of the global economic turmoil triggered by the subprime crisis in 2007, the world 
economy entered into a deep recession and suffered a severe credit crunch that affected 
most economies. Policymakers around the globe responded by adopting expansionary 
macroeconomic policies and different measures to support financial markets. 
Central banks also responded with large interest rate cuts. In a number of developed 
countries, policy rates have been close to zero since the end of 2008. In order to provide 
additional monetary stimulus once the policy rate reached the zero lower bound, the 
monetary authorities in some of these economies adopted unconventional monetary policy 
actions, such as changes in the composition and size of their balance sheets. These 
measures, aimed at restoring the orderly functioning of financial markets and attenuating the 
negative impact on economic activity, have contributed to a significant increase in 
international liquidity. 
Aggressive fiscal stimulus packages were implemented in advanced and some emerging 
economies. Taxes were reduced and public expenditures were raised. The extraordinary 
amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus reduced the fall in aggregate demand and 
contributed to the rebound of global economic activity. As a result, from 2009 onwards the 
global economy began to recover. However, the economic recovery is still fragile in some 
cases, and uneven among regions and countries.  
Developed economies have recovered at a moderate pace; for instance, the improvement in 
private demand and employment has been mostly subdued. This situation has owed to the 
fact that advanced economies, such as the United States, which have typically run current 
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expenditures to sustainable levels. Under these conditions, the recovery of economic activity 
has depended on the implementation of accommodative macroeconomic policies.  
Although the fiscal stimulus measures have been useful in supporting economic activity, they 
have also contributed to a significant deterioration in the fiscal accounts of a number of 
advanced economies, raising concerns about fiscal and public debt sustainability. In the case 
of some euro area countries, these concerns escalated at the beginning of the second 
quarter of 2010. The fear of a new episode of financial turbulence forced the adoption of 
fiscal consolidation programmes and the intervention of the ECB and international 
organisations such as the IMF. Today, these issues are still far from being resolved. 
In the United States, although the deterioration of the fiscal position has not raised the same 
concerns as in certain European countries, and the room to accumulate debt is possibly 
much larger than in other economies, expansionary fiscal policies cannot be maintained 
indefinitely for political reasons. Eventually, the US economy will also have to strengthen its 
public finances.  
Under these circumstances, since there may be limited scope to maintain or even undertake 
further fiscal stimulus measures and since there are no important concerns about inflation in 
most developed economies, monetary conditions could remain expansionary for some time. 
For instance, the Federal Reserve recently implemented additional stimulus measures (QE2) 
in the fourth quarter of 2010.  
This global environment poses two challenges. The first involves rebalancing global demand. 
In particular, the need to adjust private and public expenditure patterns in advanced 
economies, such as the United States and a number of European economies, may lead to 
weak demand for most emerging economies’ exports. Eventually, this situation will negatively 
affect those countries that have followed an export-led growth model based on keeping a 
“depreciated” domestic currency. This growth strategy relies on advanced economies, mainly 
the United States, being a sort of consumer of last resort, in order to guarantee external 
markets for emerging economies’ exports. 
Indeed, this growth strategy could be in serious trouble as advanced economies that used to 
spend significantly more than their income, and therefore run large current account deficits, 
need to consume less and save more, as they are in fact doing. Given the prospects of a 
weak recovery of expenditures in developed countries, promoting economic growth in 
emerging countries will probably require strengthening their domestic markets.  
A rebalancing in global demand patterns is necessary and thus requires a change in relative 
prices. In particular, both a real exchange depreciation in advanced economies that run large 
external deficits and a real exchange appreciation in economies that run large current 
account surpluses is needed. Up to now, the adjustment has been relatively slow.  
The second challenge is related to liquidity growth at a global level. As mentioned, loose 
monetary conditions in the world economy have helped to stabilise financial markets and 
supported the rebound of international economic activity. However, they have also 
contributed to a surge of capital flows to emerging economies. This surge has raised 
concerns in the recipient economies.  
Perhaps most importantly, there are worries that these capital inflows will probably reverse at 
some point. This could take place when advanced economies start to withdraw the monetary 
stimulus and policy interest rates return to normal levels, or when a new episode of financial 
stress raises the level of uncertainty and risk aversion and induces capital to flee to safer 
places. And then, dealing with the effects of excessive short-run capital inflows can also be 
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3.  Capital inflows and challenges 
After contracting in late 2008, capital flows began to return to the emerging economies during 
the second and third quarters of 2009. This can be explained by a combination of factors. On 
the one hand, stronger fundamentals, such as improving growth prospects, may have 
contributed. In particular, in the case of emerging economies that specialise in exporting 
commodities, the improvement in the terms of trade associated with the increase in 
international commodity prices may have generated fundamental pressures to appreciate 
their domestic currencies. On the other hand, the unusually low interest rates prevailing in 
advanced economies have induced a “search for yield” among international investors. For 
example, interest rate differentials between advanced and emerging economies have 
encouraged carry trade transactions, in which international investors borrow in countries 
where interest rates are low and invest in countries where interest rates are high. 
It is quite clear that, in general, capital flows yield several benefits for the receiving 
economies. Among other things, they provide additional financing to countries with limited 
domestic savings and help make local financial markets deeper and more liquid. However, in 
spite of these benefits, the recent episode of massive capital inflows to these countries has 
raised a number of concerns, since part of these flows are related to carry trade operations 
and, therefore, are possibly temporary.  
Summing up, large capital inflows to emerging market economies can pose significant 
challenges, which can be grouped in the following categories. 
3.1   Exchange rate appreciation 
A key issue under a floating exchange rate regime is that fluctuations in the nominal 
exchange rate are closely tied to capital flows. For instance, massive capital inflows can lead 
to a sharp nominal appreciation. To the extent that domestic prices are sticky and do not 
adjust immediately to fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate also 
appreciates, which in turn may have an impact on exports and economic activity.  
Under this scenario, firms producing tradable goods can be significantly damaged, and some 
of them may even be forced out of business. Concerns about a loss of competitiveness due 
to a domestic currency appreciation are present in a number of emerging economies that 
have adopted an export-led growth strategy based on maintaining a depreciated currency in 
real terms. 
This challenge arises independently of the nature of the capital inflows. That is, both capital 
flows driven by stronger fundamentals and those driven by short-term considerations tend to 
appreciate the real exchange rate. Of course, one would expect the appreciation to be 
permanent in the first case, while temporary in the second. 
3.2  Financial stability concerns 
Capital inflows may also lead to excessive credit expansion and sharp increases in asset 
prices, mainly when short-term factors are behind such inflows. For example, an episode of 
low interest rates in advanced economies may lead to higher risk appetite for emerging 
economies’ assets among foreign investors. This may induce credit and asset price booms in 
the recipient economies and thus contribute to the development of asset price bubbles. 
These problems worsen when massive capital inflows to emerging economies are 
intermediated by poorly regulated domestic financial institutions, since a weak regulatory 
framework may result, among other things, in excessive risk-taking. Furthermore, if domestic 
financial institutions have access to cheap foreign funding, they may be tempted to loosen 
their credit standards and (absent regulation) can even incur balance sheet currency 
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increasing financial fragility. At this point, the domestic financial system as a whole could 
become increasingly vulnerable.  
3.3  Risks of sudden reversals in capital flows 
Another concern mainly related to short-term capital flows such as those associated with 
carry trade operations is the possibility of an abrupt reversal. Empirical evidence shows that 
such reversals, known as “sudden stops” in the economic literature, have an adverse impact 
on domestic economies (Calvo (1998)). 
In general, “sudden stops” refer to a sharp reversal in capital inflows and the corresponding 
adjustment in external accounts. These abrupt reversals in foreign financing lead to sharp 
contractions of domestic expenditure and production, collapses in the real exchange rate and 
reductions in both asset prices and credit to the private sector (Arellano and Mendoza (2002)). 
Summing up, large capital inflows to emerging economies may negatively affect economic 
activity and financial stability through different channels. In this setting, it becomes crucial to 
analyse the menu of policy response options that policymakers have at their disposal to deal 
with large surges in capital inflows and their associated risks. 
4.  The policy response to capital inflows 
The recent massive capital inflows to emerging economies have induced policymakers to 
implement different measures to prevent excessive currency appreciations, address financial 
stability concerns and reduce the economy’s vulnerability to sudden reversals of capital 
flows. The tools that can be part of the policy response to this phenomenon can be grouped 
into: (i) macroeconomic policy; (ii) foreign reserve accumulation; (iii) macroprudential policy; 
and (iv) structural reforms. 
In general, the adequate policy mix depends mainly on the nature of the capital inflows and 
the specific conditions in each economy. First of all, an important distinction needs to be 
made between two types of inflows: on the one hand, those that are primarily driven by 
strong fundamentals, such as favourable economic growth prospects, and are expected to 
remain stable in the medium and long term; and, on the other hand, those that are mainly 
driven by wide interest rate differentials, which may reverse abruptly in the near future. 
Identifying which of these two factors is the main driver of capital inflows is a difficult task that 
requires both analysis and the policymakers’ judgment. 
As will be discussed in this section, the use of each of the policy tools implies benefits and 
costs, which have to be taken into account when assessing the appropriate policy mix to deal 
with large capital inflows. However, quantifying both the benefits and the costs associated 
with the implementation of these policies is a complex task, which makes determining the 
appropriate policy response a very difficult process. 
This section analyses qualitatively the appropriate response to capital inflows, taking into 
consideration the nature of capital inflows and the benefits and costs associated with each of 
the policy actions implemented. 
4.1  Capital inflows driven by fundamentals 
If capital flows to emerging market economies are mainly driven by fundamental factors, it 
can be argued that the corresponding real appreciation, and the consequent change in 
relative prices, reflects the need to reallocate resources in the economy. The danger here 
would be an excessive expansion of domestic demand that could lead to inflationary 
pressures in the non-tradable sector which would, in turn, also lead to a further appreciation 
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Under these conditions, policy actions should facilitate rather than impede the reallocation of 
resources from tradable to non-tradable sectors. In principle, instead of adopting measures 
aimed at containing appreciation pressures and trying to maintain an undervalued currency 
in real terms, policymakers should allow a nominal (and real) appreciation caused by stable 
and long-term capital flows. That is, the currency should appreciate to a value corresponding 
to the country’s economic fundamentals. 
Nevertheless, if the magnitude of capital inflows leads to a sharp appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, which could affect economic activity in the short run, it may be convenient to 
adopt measures to mitigate the appreciation pressures. In this setting, the policy response 
would imply mainly adjusting the macroeconomic policy stance, although implementing 
structural reforms can be very beneficial in the long run. 
4.1.1 Macroeconomic  policy 
One way in which emerging market economies can deal with the appreciation pressures 
related to massive capital inflows is through fiscal consolidation. To the extent that this is a 
real response, it could work in the direction of attenuating a real exchange rate appreciation.  
In particular, since a significant part of public expenditures involves non-tradable goods, 
fiscal consolidation exerts downward pressure on the price of these goods. The decline in the 
relative price of non-tradable goods and services tends to depreciate the real exchange rate 
or, at least, to ease appreciation pressures. Empirical evidence suggests that fiscal restraint 
during periods of large capital inflows can help limit real exchange appreciation (IMF (2007)).  
In turn, monetary policy should seek to ensure that the adjustment in the real exchange rate 
takes place in an orderly way, that is, with minimum costs in terms of inflation and economic 
activity. A prudent monetary policy is needed in order to keep inflation expectations well 
anchored and maintain an environment of low and stable inflation. 
A fiscal consolidation programme and a prudent monetary policy lead to stronger 
macroeconomic fundamentals, which helps improve foreign investors’ confidence and induce 
long-term and stable capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI). This brings forth 
many benefits. For instance, economies with stronger fundamentals tend to be relatively less 
affected by adverse external shocks. There is some evidence of sound fiscal policies being 
associated with lower sovereign risk (Afonso et al (2007); Akitoby and Stratmann, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the additional sources of external funding associated with better fundamentals 
may also lead to further appreciation pressures that may require additional fiscal measures. 
It is also important to note that fiscal tightening as a response to capital inflows has some 
limitations. For instance, fiscal measures usually require approval by the legislature and, 
consequently, are executed with a lag. They may also be a difficult political task. 
Sound fiscal and monetary policies aimed at strengthening macroeconomic fundamentals 
and improving investors’ confidence should be coupled with structural reforms in order to 
fully take advantage of the benefits related to capital inflows. In particular, adopting an 
institutional framework that fosters greater competition becomes necessary, as it allows more 
flexibility to allocate productive resources and establishes incentives in a way that economic 
agents can adopt more efficient and productive technologies and processes. For instance, it 
is crucial to implement reforms in areas such as antitrust law, the labour market and the 
quality of education. 
Overall, it would certainly be desirable for recipient economies to adopt measures to 
generate incentives for external resources to be allocated towards the most productive 
projects. Perhaps most importantly, to do so these economies should (politically) try to open 
up and allow capital to be invested in economic sectors that are currently closed to foreign 
investment. All these measures would maximise the contribution of capital inflows to 
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4.1.2  Foreign reserve accumulation 
If the financial authorities consider that the economy has low levels of international reserves, 
then episodes such as those currently experienced of large capital inflows to emerging 
economies represent an opportunity to accumulate foreign reserve holdings.  
The most common motivation for holding large reserves in emerging economies with a 
flexible exchange rate is to self-insure against adverse external shocks. Foreign reserves 
allow for a larger margin of manoeuvre to cope with these shocks and thus can help mitigate 
their negative impact on the domestic economy. A level of foreign reserves perceived as 
adequate by international investors can help improve confidence in the economy and, hence, 
lead to lower risk premia. This reduces the cost of external borrowing for both public and 
private sectors. For example, credit rating agencies take foreign reserve indicators into 
consideration when assessing a country’s creditworthiness.  
Foreign exchange interventions associated with international reserve accumulation may also 
ease appreciation pressures. However, despite the availability of intervention data in 
advanced economies, the empirical evidence on its effectiveness in influencing the exchange 
rate remains mixed at best (Sarno and Taylor (2001); Humpage (2003)). In the case of 
emerging economies, where data limitations are much greater, the empirical literature is still 
relatively limited, and there is no conclusive evidence concerning the effectiveness of foreign 
exchange interventions.  
One should also keep in mind the following. Since we are talking in this case about long-term 
“equilibrium” inflows, the receiving country will ultimately reach its desired level of reserves, 
at which point it should cease to accumulate reserves. The reason for this is that, as is well 
known, there are costs associated with accumulating foreign reserves. In this sense, the 
benefits of having international reserves need to be balanced against these costs when 
assessing the adequate level of reserves.  
When central banks accumulate foreign reserves, they tend to neutralise the increase in the 
monetary base generated by purchases of foreign currency, usually via open market 
operations. In this setting, a financial cost arises for central banks from the interest rate 
differentials between the rate these institutions have to pay on the securities they sell for 
monetary regulation purposes and the return they receive on the foreign-denominated assets 
that they hold. 
Usually, central bank profits (when they occur) are transferred to governments. Under these 
circumstances, the losses in the central banks’ equity related to the cost of sterilisation can 
be interpreted as a quasi-fiscal cost. In general, the repeated implementation of sterilisation 
operations for an extended period of time can lead to an accumulation of large losses in the 
central bank’s capital, which could eventually lead to “reputational” costs for these 
institutions. However, the issue of central banks having negative capital and whether it can 
be costly for society is being debated in the literature and therefore is not addressed in this 
paper. On the other hand, from the perspective of the economy as a whole, the resources 
used to finance foreign reserve accumulation could alternatively be used to finance either 
public or private investment projects. In the former case, one can certainly believe that, 
beyond a certain point, the resources for financing the accumulation of reserves might be 
used to finance public programmes with high social returns, thus representing a steep 
opportunity cost for this policy from that point on.   
There may also be adverse multilateral effects. For instance, foreign exchange interventions 
implemented by some economies to accumulate foreign reserves in order to prevent or 
inhibit an exchange rate appreciation may lead other economies to adopt similar policies (a 
beggar-thy neighbour situation). Finally, in the case of some large economies, an aggressive 
accumulation of reserves can also lead to large externalities to other countries which, quite 
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4.2  Capital inflows driven by short-term considerations 
If an episode of a surge in capital inflows is driven by factors other than fundamentals, such 
as carry trade operations, the corresponding real exchange rate appreciation may just be a 
temporary phenomenon and may reverse possibly even within a short period. Under such 
circumstances, the contraction of activity in the tradable goods sector would be hard to 
justify. In fact, the decline of these sectors represents a waste of productive resources for the 
economy as a whole. Furthermore, since such sectors may not recover immediately or, in the 
case of some firms, even fail to recover, the damage to the economy may be enduring.  
4.2.1 Macroeconomic  policy 
Relaxing the monetary policy stance in response to portfolio capital inflows can narrow the 
differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates, and therefore reduce the incentives 
for carry trade operations. This may be an appropriate policy action when there are no 
inflationary concerns. Reducing the policy rate, however, would contribute to stimulating 
aggregate demand, which could start generating pressures on inflation. 
On the other hand, under conditions where a country is facing an upsurge in capital flows, 
tightening monetary conditions to address an inflation problem can have undesirable side 
effects. Indeed, increasing domestic interest rates may further encourage carry trade 
transactions, which could attract further capital inflows. Under this setting, the monetary 
authorities face a difficult trade-off and therefore may require the support of fiscal 
consolidation measures. 
In particular, reducing the public sector’s funding needs tends to relieve pressures on interest 
rates, thus working towards discouraging short-term capital inflows. Fiscal tightening can 
also support monetary policy by relieving upward pressures on prices. Also, since most 
public expenditures are destined for the non-tradable sector, as mentioned, a fiscal 
retrenchment works towards attenuating a real exchange appreciation.  
4.2.2  Foreign reserve accumulation 
The policy response to portfolio inflows also includes foreign reserve accumulation. As 
mentioned, the most common motivation for holding large reserves in emerging economies is 
to self-insure against adverse external shocks such as abrupt reversals in capital flows. This 
is particularly relevant when capital inflows are driven by short-term factors.  
Emerging market countries accumulate reserves in good times so as to be able to use them 
as a buffer against the impact of external shocks on domestic absorption and mitigate the 
contraction of domestic output. In theory, authorities can reduce the output cost of a crisis by 
using foreign reserves. First, reserves allow monetary authorities to provide foreign 
exchange liquidity to the domestic financial markets, contributing to an orderly adjustment of 
the exchange rate, and thus avoiding the disruption induced by an episode of high exchange 
rate volatility. 
Second, besides being a buffer to absorb adverse external shocks, foreign reserves are also 
perceived as a tool to reduce the probability of self-fulfilling speculative attacks (Feldstein 
(1999)). In particular, a country with large foreign reserves is less likely to suffer from such 
attacks. To illustrate this point, consider the case of a country whose short-term private and 
government liabilities denominated in foreign currency exceed its foreign exchange reserves. 
Such a country may be solvent in the sense that it can service its foreign currency debts with 
its future export earnings, but may be temporarily illiquid because it does not have enough 
funds to meet its immediate obligations. If foreign creditors have confidence in the country 
and its currency, they will continue to roll over the short-term debt. However, if they worry 
that the country might not meet its obligations, the country could experience a currency 
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tools to deter the currency attack and the probability of a sudden reversal in capital inflows 
would tend to be higher (Feldstein (1999)). 
Finally, accumulating reserves under these conditions has another rationale. If capital is 
believed to flow outwardly at some point, it could be desirable to try to avoid the original 
capital inflow to be intermediated by the economy altogether.  
Regardless of its potential benefits, and as already discussed in previous sections, foreign 
reserve accumulation also entails costs. Consequently, when assessing the convenience of 
increasing the level of reserves, the benefits of having foreign reserves need to be compared 
to these costs.  
4.2.3  Macroprudential regulation and supervision 
The policy response to short-term capital inflows may also consider the use of some 
macroprudential tools to deal with the financial consequences of this type of flows. In 
general, adequate regulation and supervision may be useful in preventing an inefficient 
intermediation of capital inflows driven by carry trade motives, and thus help to contain 
systemic risk in the domestic financial sector. 
In principle, there are different prudential tools at the disposal of policymakers. Some of 
them, such as reserve requirements or credit ceilings, can be used to prevent unsustainable 
credit expansions. Others are aimed at maintaining the quality of loans, among them limits 
on currency mismatches and improved credit information. Other tools, such as capital 
requirements, can be used to enhance the financial system’s resilience to adverse shocks.  
Policymakers have to analyse how and when to use these instruments. This poses a 
technical challenge since it is difficult to calibrate the appropriate policy response when using 
some of these tools. Furthermore, in economies lacking deep and liquid domestic financial 
markets, some of these measures may inhibit financial innovation, thus delaying the 
development of the financial system. 
A particular set of measures that has been regarded as a macroprudential tool, and which 
some emerging economies are adopting in order to cope with massive capital flows, are 
capital controls. In general, these can be imposed either by limiting asset transactions 
through market-based mechanisms, such as taxes, or through administrative measures, 
such as explicit quantitative limits or outright prohibitions. 
One problem with both types of capital controls is their enforcement. Capital controls can be 
eluded if transactions are misreported by economic agents as capital inflows of the type that 
are either not subject to controls or are subject to lower tax rates. As long as the benefits of 
capital transactions exceed the cost of eluding capital controls, there will be incentives to 
circumvent them. The increasing financial integration across economies suggests that there 
are significant benefits related to capital mobility for economic agents and, for this reason, 
they will try to evade controls. 
The adoption of capital controls may therefore require frequent adjustments aimed at 
avoiding circumvention, which tends to increase the cost associated with the implementation 
of these measures. Nevertheless, capital controls tend to lose their effectiveness over time 
because economic agents will always find a way to evade them.  
As for the empirical evidence on this topic, the economic literature reveals mixed results. For 
instance, many studies have found little or no effect of capital controls on the overall volume 
of capital inflows (IMF (2007)). However, there is some evidence that controls may change 
the composition of capital inflows towards longer maturities (Laurens and Cardoso (1998); 
De Gregorio et al (2000)). On the one hand, to the extent that short-term capital flows are 
regarded as volatile and risky, the change in the composition of capital flows between short-
term and long-term flows can reduce the risk of a “sudden stop”. On the other, since capital 248  BIS Papers No 57
 
 
controls may not affect the overall size of capital flows to emerging economies, appreciation 
pressures could persist.  
However, even if capital controls are effective, they entail a number of problems, and any 
benefit associated with their use should be weighed against the resulting distortions.  
One problem is that capital controls may be regarded as punitive measures against capital 
mobility and financial integration across economies, which may adversely affect investors’ 
confidence. Furthermore, the imposition of capital controls may raise uncertainty about future 
policy actions, which may also negatively affect foreign agents’ willingness to invest in the 
country. As a result, FDI might decrease and external financing become more expensive. 
Many emerging economies have significantly improved their regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks following the financial crises of the 1990s. On several dimensions, these 
frameworks may be more rigorous than those of advanced economies. For example, banks’ 
capital requirements are usually above the international rule of 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
This helps explain the resilience of emerging economies’ banks during the recent global 
financial crisis. In fact, these economies did not experience a domestic financial crisis. Thus, 
they are in a relatively better position to efficiently intermediate massive capital inflows.  
However, instead of being intermediated by domestic banks and other financial institutions, 
capital flows can go directly into financial markets such as stock markets. Thus, even if 
financial institutions, such as banks, are properly regulated and supervised, asset price 
bubbles can arise. In order for these prudential measures to be effective in impeding the 
formation of bubbles, prudential regulation and supervision should be extended to all relevant 
financial institutions and markets. 
5.   Recent capital inflows and the policy response in Mexico 
Capital flows to Mexico decreased sharply following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008. During the last quarter of that year, total foreign investment was only 
around 10% of the level reached a year earlier. Most of the contraction was due to a 
reduction in portfolio investment. There was significantly less access to international financial 
markets for domestic agents, while the exchange rate depreciated substantially and became 
more volatile. Furthermore, in an environment of harsh conditions in global credit markets 
and lower foreign currency revenues (oil exports), at the beginning of 2009 investors were 
concerned that Mexico could face problems in financing an estimated moderate increase in 
its current account deficit for that year (Sidaoui et al (2010)). 
Mexico’s authorities responded rapidly and adopted several measures to supply liquidity to 
the foreign exchange market and restore its orderly functioning. Among these measures, the 
Foreign Exchange Commission (FXC) instructed the central bank to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market using several mechanisms (Sidaoui et al (2010)). The FXC also published 
its forecasts for the balance of payments for 2009, listing several reasons why no problems 
in financing the external deficit were expected. Finally, two additional measures were taken: 
a swap line was arranged with the US Federal Reserve, and a Flexible Credit Line (FCL) was 
signed with the IMF.  
These measures, combined with reduced uncertainty in international financial markets, 
resulting from the G20’s announcement regarding the allocation of more resources from 
advanced to emerging economies, and the favourable results of the stress tests applied to 
US commercial banks, helped to improve confidence and gradually led to a recovery of 
capital flows to Mexico and other emerging markets. As mentioned in previous sections, 
these flows rebounded from the second quarter of 2009 onwards. Additionally, and perhaps 
most importantly, even in light of a very steep recession, Mexico undertook an important 
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5.1  Capital flows to Mexico and challenges 
The increased access to external financing led to substantial capital flows to Mexico from the 
second half of 2009 onwards. For instance, total foreign investment increased from 
US$ 1.61 billion in the last quarter of 2008 to US$ 14.14 billion in the first quarter of 2011. By 
mid-2010, total foreign investment was at levels similar to those observed prior to the crisis 
(Figure 1). The rebound was particularly evident in the case of portfolio investment. For 
example, its share of total foreign investment rose from 14% during the first quarter of 2009 
(US$ 760 million), to 66% (US$ 9.3 billion) during the first quarter of 2011. 
 
Figure 1 
Capital inflows: foreign investment in Mexico 
(In millions of US dollars)  
 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
Of course, a first consideration that needs to be discussed pertains to the nature of these 
flows. As has already been said, once there was a change of sentiment in international 
financial markets from mid-2009 onwards, and given the exceptionally low interest rates in 
advanced economies, an important search for yield in markets began to thrive once more. 
Combined with this was the perception that emerging market economies would recover much 
quicker than advanced ones, and would continue to grow quite rapidly. As it turned out, there 
has been a two-speed recovery, with emerging economies growing much faster than 
advanced economies.  
In the case of Mexico, once the episode of uncertainty from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the 
first half of 2009 was over, capital flows started entering the country again. This was due to 
several factors: the US economy began to recover; Mexico strengthened its fiscal stance 
and, in 2010, joined the World Government Bond Index (WGBI), which triggered renewed 
flows; and finally, the Fed’s decision to implement QE2 also certainly contributed to making 
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Exchange rate appreciation 
In terms of the challenges that global liquidity poses to Mexico it should be noted that, as 
mentioned, the resurgence of capital flows to emerging economies has led to an appreciation 
of their currencies. However, in Mexico the exchange rate appreciated relatively less than in 
other Latin American countries. For example, the peso appreciated around 20% from April 
2009 to May 2011, while the currencies of countries such as Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
appreciated 44%, 25% and 40%, respectively, during the same period. Figure 2 illustrates 
the evolution of the nominal exchange rates of a number of Latin American countries, and 
shows that the Mexican peso has not returned to levels similar to those prior to the crisis.  
Among the factors that may help explain the smaller appreciation of the Mexican peso are 
the relatively less favourable economic prospects for the Mexican economy. Mexico is highly 
integrated with the United States. The deleveraging process and the need to adjust domestic 
expenditure patterns to sustainable levels has adversely affected expectations about the 
economic recovery in Mexico and, relative to the levels observed prior to the crisis, may even 
imply a permanent depreciation of the real exchange rate. The more positive scenario for 
commodities has also had a milder impact on Mexico’s outlook than in other commodity-
exporting economies in the region such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. 
 
Figure 2 
Foreign exchange rate 
(1 January 2008 = 100) 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Commercial banks’ credit to the private sector 
Another concern related to episodes of large capital inflows, mainly portfolio investment, is 
the possibility that they may lead to unsustainable “credit booms” and to sharp increases in 
asset prices. In the case of Mexico, so far the resurgence in capital flows has not been 
associated with excessive credit expansion. Figure 3 shows the evolution of commercial 
banks’ credit to the private sector in Mexico during the last decade. After experiencing a BIS Papers No 57  251
 
 
contraction following the financial crisis in the mid-1990s, this type of credit rebounded in the 
early 2000s. During those years, the growth of the Mexican banking system allowed a larger 
fraction of the population to have access to financial products, thereby explaining why credit 
to households grew vigorously at that time (albeit starting from a very low base).  
However, in the second half of the decade, this process began to reach its limits, and bank 
credit started to grow at lower rates as banks began to be more reluctant to grant loans to 
riskier clients. This slowdown in credit growth intensified as financial conditions in 
international financial markets became more stringent during the 2008–09 crisis. Although it 
started to recover in 2010, bank credit is only now starting to grow at higher rates. This fact, 
along with the evolution of a number of indicators such as consumer confidence and retail 
sales, among others, shows no evidence of a “credit boom”. Indeed, presently there are no 
concerns about an episode of excessive risk-taking in Mexico. 
 
Figure 3 
Commercial banks’ credit to households and firms 
(Real annual percentage changes) 
 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
Although the relatively moderate appreciation of the Mexican peso and the performance of 
commercial banks’ credit do not suggest a “credit boom”, the current episode of capital flows 
to emerging economies does not imply that Mexico is exempt from risks. For instance, the 
possibility that part of the capital flowing to Mexico is motivated by short-term considerations 
is a source of concern. An abrupt reversal of these flows constitutes a risk, for example, 
whenever advanced economies decide to start withdrawing the monetary stimulus. 
5.2  Policy response to capital inflows 
This section analyses the set of policy actions adopted by the Mexican authorities to cope 
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taken. In particular, the macroeconomic policy stance, international reserve accumulation 
and the changes in the macroprudential regulatory framework are discussed. 
Before going into this, though, it is important to state that the Mexican authorities have 
sought to ensure that the implemented measures not impose distortions that could affect the 
prospects for economic growth in the long run. For instance, the central bank has followed a 
rule-oriented strategy to accumulate foreign reserves, without altering the functioning of the 
flexible exchange rate regime. Furthermore, no capital controls have been imposed.  
5.2.1 Macroeconomic  policy 
The macroeconomic policy stance has contributed to strengthening the Mexican economy, 
attenuating the risks associated with large capital inflows. This section analyses both 
monetary policy and fiscal policy and their relationship with capital flows to Mexico. 
5.2.1.1 Monetary  policy 
As regards the monetary policy stance, during the first half of 2009, as was the case for most 
economies, the balance of risks for monetary policy in Mexico deteriorated significantly more 
in terms of economic activity than of inflation. In fact, even in light of a sharp nominal 
exchange rate depreciation, inflation expectations remained relatively well anchored. The 
inflation rate reached its highest level in December 2008 and then started to fall in early 
2009. A wide negative output gap and a worsening outlook for economic activity, as well as 
lower energy and food prices, contributed to easing inflationary pressures. The country’s 
weak economic performance during the first quarter of 2009 worsened in the second quarter 
of that year, which led to a downward revision in economic growth prospects for 2009. Under 
these circumstances, a sharp economic contraction was the main source of concern. 
Against this backdrop, the Bank of Mexico began a cycle of monetary policy easing aimed at 
lessening the adverse impact of the international financial crisis and the global recession on 
the Mexican economy. The target for the interbank rate was reduced from 8.25% in 
December 2008 to 4.50% in July 2009.  
By mid-2009, the improvement in the economic prospects for emerging economies, including 
Mexico, and the abundant liquidity worldwide contributed to a rebound of capital flows to 
these economies. In this setting, the loosening of monetary conditions in Mexico might have 
helped to partially attenuate the incentives to carry trade operations among international 
investors. Otherwise, the widening in interest rate differentials between Mexico and 
advanced economies, such as the United States, that would have taken place would have 
encouraged even further portfolio capital inflows to Mexico. 
Nevertheless, the fact that inflation expectations remained above the central bank’s target 
implied a smaller margin of manoeuvre to implement additional policy rate cuts. Under these 
conditions, prudent fiscal policy management was required to further improve investors’ 
confidence and to mitigate the risks associated with short-term capital flows. 
5.2.1.2 Fiscal  policy 
When the crisis began to hit the Mexican economy, the Federal Government tried to reduce 
the contraction in aggregate demand by adopting some countercyclical fiscal policy 
measures, such as increasing public expenditures in infrastructure, freezing household 
energy prices, reducing industrial electricity tariffs and implementing programmes to support 
employment, among others. Most of this was to be done through a “front-loading” of public 
expenditures, given a mainly unaltered balance target for public finances.  
However, by mid-2009, the economic recession deepened more than anticipated, leading to 
a sharp drop in tax revenues. This situation, along with the deterioration of investors’ 
confidence during the first months of the year, made the adoption of a fiscal consolidation 
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onwards that was approved by Congress. The reform included a permanent increase in the 
general VAT rate, permanent and temporary increases in excise taxes, temporary increases 
in income taxes and reductions in current public expenditures. 
Although these fiscal measures led to higher inflation rates during the first quarter of 2010 
due to the one-off effects of the new taxes on price levels, they also contributed to 
strengthening Mexico’s economic fundamentals and therefore improved investors’ sentiment 
significantly. Without the strengthening of the structural fiscal position associated with these 
fiscal measures, the stable sources of external financing, such as FDI, might have evolved 
less favourably, further increasing the risks associated with portfolio capital inflows. 
Moreover, since government spending in Mexico, as elsewhere, is mainly channelled to non-
tradable goods and services, the fiscal consolidation process exerted downward pressures 
on non-tradable prices, helping to moderate the appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Other measures also contributed to strengthening the country’s fiscal stance. First, in order 
to reduce the volatility of fiscal revenues due to fluctuations in international oil prices, Mexico 
implemented a strategy to hedge its oil income revenues through option contracts. Second, 
the Mexican authorities have pursued an active public debt management policy that has 
helped to improve the public debt profile by, among other things, increasing its duration.  
5.2.2  Foreign reserve policy 
An important element of the policy response to capital inflows has been the accumulation of 
foreign reserves. The need for higher levels of reserves in emerging market economies such 
as Mexico responds to their relative vulnerability with respect to negative external shocks, 
such as abrupt reversals in capital flows (“sudden stops”). When assessing a country’s 
creditworthiness, the rating agencies regard the amount of foreign reserves as an indicator of 
a country’s solvency. Furthermore, if a country’s reserve level is below that of other countries 
with similar characteristics, then it obtains a lower rating. Thus, the level of international 
reserves has consequences for the cost of capital and for international investors’ perception 
of the vulnerability of a given country.  
Table 1 shows a number of indicators of the reserve level in a sample of 19 emerging 
economies of Latin America, East Asia and eastern Europe. Mexico’s international reserve 
indicators, in general, were lower than those observed in other emerging economies by the 
end of 2009. 
There is an extensive literature that attempts to define some benchmarks for reserve 
adequacy (De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001)). In particular, this literature considers 
different sources of vulnerability that must be covered by the economies and proposes 
reserve adequacy ratios. For instance, the most common are a ratio of reserves to broad 
money of 5–20%, a ratio of reserves to imports of 25% (three months of imports) and a ratio 
of reserves to short-term external debt of 100% (Greenspan-Guidotti rule).  
Almost all countries, including Mexico, satisfied these rules of thumb in 2009. However, 
Mexico exhibited lower ratios than the other countries. For instance, it had a lower 
reserves/GDP ratio than the average of economies with similar credit ratings. Furthermore, 
foreign reserves as a fraction of imports and of broad money stood at 42% and 20%, 
respectively, while the average for countries with similar ratings was 94% and 57%, 
respectively. As for reserves/short-term debt, Mexico had a higher ratio than economies with 
the same grade (288% vs 234%). Nevertheless, countries with a higher rating than Mexico 
exhibited a significantly higher ratio (547% on average). The downgrading of Mexico’s debt 
by some credit agencies in late 2009 was partly attributed to the relatively low levels of 
foreign reserves. 
The external environment characterised by large capital flows to emerging markets, and the 
associated risks, made economic conditions in 2010 conducive to accumulating international 
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previously, policymakers deemed that larger holdings of reserves would help to improve 
market participants’ confidence in the Mexican economy, and help the country self-insure 
against possible reversals in capital inflows. As a result, at the beginning of 2010 the 
Mexican authorities decided to foster the process of foreign reserve accumulation.  
 
Table 1 
International reserve indicators 
S&P 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009
China A+ (+4) 1530 2416 44 48 29 27 160 240 1251 1609
Chile A+ (+4) 17 25 10 15 19 27 36 60 86 129
Czech Republic A (+3) 35 41 20 22 30 30 29 39 198 307
Israel A (+3) 29 61 17 31 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 589 606
Korea A (+3) 262 270 25 32 19 22 73 84 176 177
Poland A- (+2) 63 76 15 18 32 33 38 52 234 225
Malaysia A -  ( + 2 )1 0 1 9 55 44 94 43 46 97 7 4 4 8 5 5 8
South Africa BBB+ (+1) 30 35 10 12 15 19 33 48 173 261
Thailand BBB+ (+1) 85 135 34 51 34 N.A. 60 100 868 1048
Mexico BBB 87 100 8 11 18 20 31 42 259 288
Russia BBB 467 417 36 34 90 84 190 197 493 618
Croatia BBB 14 15 23 24 N.A. N.A. 53 70 71 71
Bulgaria BBB 16 17 42 36 56 51 55 73 180 152
Lithuania BBB 8 6 19 17 44 37 31 35 149 95
India BBB- (-1) 267 265 22 21 31 N.A. 119 104 340 309
Hungary BBB- (-1) 24 44 17 34 34 62 25 56 88 131
Brazil BBB- (-1) 179 237 13 15 45 41 142 178 292 306
Peru BBB- (-1) 27 32 25 25 81 N.A. 114 152 284 301
Colombia BB+  (-2) 21 25 10 11 30 30 63 75 207 386
239 351 26 31 28 27 62 88 447 547
126 114 30 28 63 57 82 94 223 234
87 100 8 11 18 20 31 42 259 288









(USD billions) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Average countries with a higher rating
Credit rating
1/ Total reserves 
2/
Average countries with the same rating
Mexico
Average countries with a lower rating
N.A. = not available; ST = short-term. 
1  Ratings as of 31 December 2009. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of notches above or 
below Mexico’s grade. Source: Standard & Poor’s.    
2  Reserves are the sum of currencies, reserve positions 
at the IMF and the value in US dollars of SDR holdings by authorities. Source: IMF.    
3  Source: IMF.    
4  Broad 
monetary aggregate corresponds to M2 (national definitions). Source: IMF.    
5  Imports are customs statistics 
reported under the general trade system, according to the UN recommendations of the International 
Merchandise Trade Statistics: Concepts and Definitions, 1998. Source: IMF.    
6  Short-term debt data were 
obtained by adding two concepts: short-term international debt securities and short-term liabilities to BIS 
reporting banks. International debt securities comprise securities issued in foreign currency by residents and 
non-residents. Sources: IMF; Joint External Debt Hub of the World Bank, BIS, OECD and IMF. 
 
Nevertheless, it was crucial that the accumulation of reserves did not interfere with the 
functioning of the flexible exchange rate regime. In particular, as is well known, a free floating 
regime simplifies monetary policy management because the exchange rate can adjust more 
rapidly to domestic and external shocks. This is relevant for emerging economies, such as 
Mexico, that are subject to negative external shocks which tend to adversely affect 
economies’ external accounts and require an adjustment of the economy to the deteriorating 
external environment. In this case, a depreciation of the real exchange rate through a floating 
nominal exchange rate regime allows for the needed adjustment with reduced costs to the 
economy in terms of inflation and activity.  
5.2.2.1 Rule-oriented  mechanism 
By law, the Bank of Mexico is the fiscal agent of both the state oil company Petróleos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX) and the Federal Government. Under this setting, the most important 
source of reserve accumulation in Mexico is exports from PEMEX, which sells US dollars 
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services to the Federal Government, which usually requires foreign currency in order to 
service its external debt obligations. These arrangements help to isolate the foreign 
exchange market from foreign currency transactions corresponding to these two large 
players. In fact, allowing them to participate in the foreign exchange market would probably 
interfere with the orderly functioning of the exchange market. These mechanisms also allow 
the Bank of Mexico to accumulate foreign reserves without the need for discretionary 
interventions.  
At the beginning of 2010, the Bank of Mexico’s reserve accumulation resulting from its 
operations with PEMEX and the Federal Government was estimated at approximately 
US$ 15 billion that year. In February 2010, the Foreign Exchange Commission decided to 
increase the speed at which international reserves are accumulated. A rule-oriented 
mechanism based on the auction among credit institutions of US$ 600 million per month in 
put options that could be exercised in the subsequent month was put in place as of March 
2010. These options give holders the right to sell US dollars to the central bank on any 
working day at the previous reference interbank exchange rate (known as the FIX rate), as 
long as it does not exceed its average of the 20 preceding business days.  
This mechanism, which had been successfully used from 1996 to 2001, is designed to give 
market participants the incentive to exercise options whenever there seems to be an 
“excess” supply of US dollars in the market. More importantly, it allows for accumulating 
reserves without “predetermining” the level of the exchange rate. That is, it does not distort 
the foreign exchange market. So far, the total amount exercised by credit institutions has 
been US$ 7,880 million (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 
US dollar auctions 
1 
(In millions of US dollars) 
 
1  Data up to 31 May 2011. 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
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The level of international reserves increased from US$ 90,838 million. in December 2009 to 
US$ 127,982 million by May 2011. That is, the Bank of Mexico accumulated US$ 22,759 million 
in 2010 and approximately 23% of this amount (US$ 5,165 million) was through the option 
mechanism. This increase in the amount of central bank foreign reserves, along with 
resources from both the Federal Reserve swap line and the Flexible Credit Line with the IMF, 
were essential to strengthen the country’s fundamentals and improve investors’ confidence. 
5.2.2.2  International reserves and the central bank’s balance sheet 
The Bank of Mexico has always fully sterilised the foreign reserve accumulation. The large 
increase in foreign exchange reserves since 2010 posed a challenge for the central bank. In 
order to illustrate this effect, let us examine its balance sheet. Figures 5a and 5b show the 




Bank of Mexico: assets 
a) Current pesos (millions)  b) Current US dollars (millions) 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
The sterilisation process, whose purpose is to absorb the additional liquidity that is injected 
into the domestic market by the central bank’s purchases of foreign currency, aims at 
isolating reserve accumulation from the monetary policy stance. Most commonly, sterilisation 
is done through open market operations, that is, the Bank of Mexico sells securities in the 
market. Sometimes, compulsory commercial bank deposits have also been used. Whenever 
these deposits have been imposed, they have been remunerated at market rates. Either the 
securities sold by the central bank to the public or the compulsory deposits of commercial 
banks increase the liabilities side of the balance sheet and, clearly, impose costs (figures 6a 
and 6b). 




Bank of Mexico: liabilities 
a) Current pesos (millions)  b) Current US dollars (millions) 
Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
So despite the benefits associated with foreign reserve accumulation, there are also costs 
involved. First, there is a quasi-fiscal cost that corresponds to the difference between what 
the central bank earns on international reserves and what it pays on the domestic debt 
issued to sterilise them. This cost may be relatively high given the current loose monetary 
conditions prevailing in advanced economies, which tend to keep interest rates low in these 
economies. This cost mirrors the benefits that investors that follow carry trade investment 
strategies earn.  
Second, to the extent that an increasing fraction of financial savings is allocated to securities 
issued for monetary regulation purposes, sterilisation implies that resources that could have 
been invested in alternative productive projects have actually been allocated to finance 
foreign reserve accumulation. That is, there is an opportunity cost.   
Third, the costs of carrying international reserves may eventually result in a high negative 
capital for the central bank and therefore entail reputational costs. 
Summing up, under the current international environment characterised by loose monetary 
conditions and large portfolio inflows to emerging economies, the benefits related to building 
international reserves for these economies seem to be higher than the corresponding costs. 
In particular, larger holdings of foreign reserves help to insure these economies against 
possible adverse shocks. Nevertheless, at some point many emerging economies will reach 
a stage where the marginal benefits and costs of accumulating reserves will need to be 
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5.2.3  Macroprudential regulation and supervision 
Another set of measures that helps to improve investors’ sentiment and hence moderate the 
risks related to short-term capital inflows involves macroprudential regulation and 
supervision.  
Mexico did not suffer a severe domestic financial crisis as many advanced economies did. 
The banking system had adequate levels of capital when the financial crisis emerged, and 
banks were able to maintain high levels of capital throughout the episode of financial 
turbulence. Furthermore, despite the negative economic conditions, they continued 
generating profits during the crisis (Bank of Mexico (2008, 2010)).  
The resilience of the Mexican banking system is mainly the result of a number of reforms that 
strengthened the financial regulatory framework in the aftermath of the 1995 financial crisis. 
That crisis made evident that bank regulation and supervision were inadequate. In order to 
overcome this situation, Mexico adopted several measures to reinforce banks’ capital and 
liquidity and to improve their risk management. Many of the policy actions that are currently 
recommended by the Basel Committee to improve financial regulatory frameworks, such as 
changes in the definition of commercial banks’ capital composition to exclude those 
components that cannot absorb loses, were implemented in Mexico after the 1995 crisis.  
However, despite the resilience of the Mexican banking sector, and the fact that currently 
there are no signals of financial imbalances in the Mexican economy, the authorities deemed 
it appropriate to adopt pre-emptive measures to further strengthen financial regulation and 
supervision. In particular, a Financial System Stability Council (Consejo de Estabilidad del 
Sistema Financiero) was created in 2010 with the participation of the central bank and the 
government financial authorities.
2 The Council aims to monitor financial and macroeconomic 
risks in the country that could have systemic repercussions. In particular, it is responsible for 
identifying early warning signals of potential problems in the financial system and making 
recommendations in order to address them. 
6.  Final remarks  
In general, capital inflows to emerging market economies have brought various benefits for 
these economies. Indeed, they let economies with insufficient savings have access to 
external resources in order to finance investment projects. Nevertheless, sudden and large 
surges of capital flows mainly driven by carry trade motives can pose significant challenges 
to the recipient countries. In particular, there are worries about an excessive appreciation of 
domestic currencies, unsustainable credit expansions and the formation of asset price 
bubbles and, perhaps most importantly, sudden reversals in capital flows with dire 
consequences for financial stability and economic activity. 
The policy response to massive capital inflows combines a number of measures such as 
modifying the macroeconomic policy stance, fostering the process of foreign reserve 
accumulation and implementing macroprudential measures. Policymakers must be extremely 
careful when assessing the adequate policy mix to cope with episodes of large capital 
inflows. In particular, they have to analyse whether capital flows are mostly driven by 
                                                  
2   The Council is made up of members from the Bank of Mexico, the Ministry of Finance, the National Securities 
and Banking Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, CNBV), the National Insurance 
Commission (Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas, CNSF), the National Retirement Savings Commission 
(Comisión Nacional del Ahorro para el Retiro, Consar), and the Deposit Insurance Agency (Instituto de 
Protección al Ahorro Bancario, IPAB). BIS Papers No 57  259
 
 
fundamentals or short-term considerations, such as carry trade operations, which is a difficult 
task to begin with. Policymakers must also take into consideration both the benefits and the 
costs related to the different policy tools at their disposal. The costs associated with these 
tools can eventually limit policymakers’ margin of manoeuvre to cope with capital inflows and 
have some implications for the economy in the medium and long term. For instance, long-
lasting sterilisation interventions could lead to large quasi-fiscal costs that eventually could 
jeopardise the central bank’s ability to conduct open market operations. 
Some actions taken to deal with capital inflows may also impose significant distortions on the 
economy. Thus, policymakers must be extremely careful when analysing the possibility of 
implementing measures such as capital controls. From a global economy perspective, it is 
important that individual policy responses do not lead to beggar-thy-neighbour policies, such 
as competitive devaluations. 
In general, policymakers in emerging economies have limited degrees of freedom to adopt 
actions to cope with episodes of large capital inflows. In order to overcome these limitations, 
these countries have to further improve their economic fundamentals. Prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and investors’ confidence 
are therefore crucial. The improvements in macroeconomic policies also need to be coupled 
with structural reforms to make the economy more flexible and competitive. Summing up, 
better fundamentals and a more competitive economy are the only way to earn higher 
degrees of freedom for emerging economies. 
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